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PERFECT 10 AND CONTRIBUTORY LIABILITY: CAN SEARCH
ENGINES SURVIVE?
Damon Chetson'
Search engines allow millions of users to locate content on the
Internet, including content offered by individuals and companies
who have infringed upon a copyright holder's rights. Copyright
Law's contributory infringement doctrine presents a dilemma for
search engines like Google, whose services may facilitate the
infringement of copyrights by enabling users to locate such content
on the Internet. The Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Perfect 10,
Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc. highlights the problems associated with
contributory liability doctrine in copyright law in the digital era.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case to the
district court, holding that "reasonable and feasible" means were
available to Google, enabling it to block access on its search
engine to content that violates a copyright holder's rights. This
recent development illustrates some of the problems of applying
the standard of contributory liability to search engines on the
Internet.
I. INTRODUCTION: REDEFINING CONTRIBUTORY
LIABILITY POST-GROKSTER
This recent development analyzes contributory copyright
liability in light of Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,2 a case
pitting a copyright owner against the search engine Google. Third-
party copyright liability in general and contributory liability in
particular are at the forefront of copyright battles currently taking
place in U.S. courts. Search engines3 often find themselves at odds
J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2009.
2 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007).
3 Search engines are website services that constantly catalog the rapidly
changing content on the Internet. Internet users locate desired information by
"searching"-entering keywords, phrases, or other identifiers-into a search
1
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with copyright holders interested in securing and maintaining
exclusive rights to their online content. The extent to which
copyright holders can succeed on contributory liability claims
against search engines will determine their future viability as
comprehensive sources of information for the public.
In Perfect 10, the copyright holder, a pornographic website,
asserted that third parties had directly infringed on its copyrighted
material by "reproducing, displaying, and distributing unauthorized
copies of Perfect 10's copyrighted images,"' a claim not disputed
on appeal by Google.' The Ninth Circuit acknowledged the
Supreme Court's holding in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd.' that a party is liable for contributory infringement
by "intentionally inducing or encouraging direct infringement."'
However, the Ninth Circuit elaborated upon the rule in Grokster by
explaining that the test for contributory infringement does not
require the defendant to prove inducement.' Drawing on a line of
copyright infringement cases stretching back to Gershwin
Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc.,9 the Court
explained that "intentionally inducing or encouraging direct
infringement"' 0 could be proven by showing a defendant's
"knowing failure to prevent infringing actions.""
engine, which quickly generates links to dozens, hundreds, or even hundreds of
thousands of websites whose contents match the desired information.
4 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 726 (9th Cir. 2007).
' Id.
6 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
7 Perfect 10, 487 F.3d at 726 (citing Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005)).
8 Perfect 10, 487 F.3d at 727 n. I1 ("Google's activities do not meet the
'inducement' test explained in Grokster because Google has not promoted the
use of its search engine specifically to infringe copyrights . . . . However, the
Supreme Court in Grokster did not suggest that a court must find inducement in
order to impose contributory liability under common law principles.")
9 443 F.2d 1159 (2nd Cir. 1971).
10 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2001);
Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159 (2nd
Cir. 1971); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., Inc., 907
F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
1 Perfect 10, 487 F.3d at 728.
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This recent development briefly reviews the development of
contributory liability in copyright law, focusing in particular on its
development as it relates to cyberspace law. Further, it analyzes
the application of contributory liability doctrine in Perfect 10,
noting the Ninth Circuit's efforts to reconcile the Supreme Court's
holding in Grokster requiring a showing of intent with previous
decisions in Napster/2 and Netcom,13 which relied on imputed
intent to find contributory liability. This recent development argues
that the Ninth Circuit's test is invalid in light of Grokster and that
the Court erred in its decision to remand the case to district court
for factual findings on the "reasonable and feasible means for
Google to refrain from providing access to infringing images."14
Finally, this recent development argues that the Ninth Circuit's
test, by focusing on the "reasonable and feasible means" available
to the alleged contributory infringer, fails on public policy
grounds.
II. COPYRIGHT AND ONLINE COMMUNICATIONS
The publication and distribution of copyrighted works has long
been a double-edged sword. Copyright owners can only realize
economic value from their protected works by making those works
available to the public. But that very distribution by copyright
owners necessarily opens the door to copying by the public. Recent
technology has raised the stakes for all parties, including copyright
holders." Intellectual property has "assume[d] a greater share of
the economy" at the same time that "technologies for copying
these properties have become increasingly efficient at doing so.
Consequently, disputes over copyrighted material have been at the
12 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
13 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n. Servs., Inc., 907 F.
Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
14 Perfect 10, 487 F.3d at 729.
5 STAN LIEBOWITZ, Back to the Future: Can Copyright Owners Appropriate
Revenues in the Face of New Copying Technologies, THE ECONOMICS OF
COPYRIGHT: DEVELOPMENTS IN RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS (Wendy J. Gordon &
Richard Watt eds., 2003).
16 Id., at 1-2.
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forefront of the news and the forefront of public policy debates."
The widespread nature of direct copyright infringement on the
Internet makes a copyright owner's enforcement of his rights
problematic at best." Furthermore, given the economics of
copyright enforcement, few companies have faced as significant
legal challenges as Google.1 9
The Ninth Circuit's view of contributory liability focuses on
two concerns unique to online communications. First, online
communications systems have the potential to facilitate a "huge
number of infringing downloads every day."20 Second, given the
volume of downloads and the number of potential infringers, a
copyright holder may find it difficult to pursue infringement
actions against the direct infringers who may number in the tens or
even hundreds of thousands. 2' The court, therefore, held in Perfect
10 "that a computer system operator can be held contributorily
liable if it has actual knowledge that specific infringing material is
available using its system . . . and can take simple measures to
prevent further damage to copyrighted works . . . , yet continues to
provide access to infringing works."22
A. SONY AND CONTRIBUTORY LIABILITY
1 See John Markoff, A Quest to Get More Court Rulings Online, and Free,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2007, at C6 (dispute over West and LexisNexis control of
published court opinions); The Associated Press, Music Publishers to Join
YouTube Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2007, at C8 (music publishers join Viacom
in suing Google over YouTube's use of allegedly copyrighted material);
Jacqueline Palank, Content Makers Are Accused of Exaggerating Copyright,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2007, at C2.
8 Lee Rainie & Mary Madden, The State of Music Downloading and File-
Sharing Online, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, April 2004,
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Societyand
the Internet/pew internet download 042504.pdf (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology) (estimating 23 million Americans
admitted to downloading music files online).
19 Kevin J. Delaney & Brooks Barnes, Image Control: For Soaring Google,
Next Act Won't Be as Easy as the First, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2005, at Al .
20 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 728 (9th Cir. 2007).
21 id
22 Id. at 729 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).
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Among Google's many legal challenges are claims that the
search engine not only directly infringes the rights of copyright
holders, but that it is contributorily liable for third party
infringement of copyright holders' intellectual property.
Contributory liability and vicarious liability constitute copyright's
third party, or indirect, liability doctrines. Contributory liability
may be imposed when the defendant, "with knowledge of the
infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the
infringing conduct of another."23
As with other areas of the common law, contributory
liability is grounded on the premise that "[i]f a person knows that
another is committing copyright infringement, it is arguably wrong
for that person to assist the infringer." 24 The crucial questions in
contributory liability are the level of knowledge required of the
defendant and the defendant's contribution to a third party's direct
infringement of a copyright holder's protected work. For instance,
a computer manufacturer might be absolutely certain that at least
some of its customers will use the equipment to download and
duplicate copyrighted works.25 By contrast, a software company
that creates and distributes the software that enables or, even, is
customized to facilitate downloading may be absolutely certain
that at least some of its customers will use the software to
download and duplicate copyrighted works. 26 Both the computer
manufacturer and the software company may know of the
infringing uses at one level. However, the computer manufacturer
is, at least intuitively, less culpable than the software company
even though both may be equally certain of the infringing uses to
which the company's product is being used.2 7 Contributory
liability doctrine, in part, distinguishes between levels of
culpability by requiring proof not just that the defendant's product
is being used in the abstract to infringe copyrights, but that the
23 Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,
1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
24 Alfred C. Yen, Third-Party Copyright Liability After Grokster, 91 MINN. L.
REV. 184, 194 (2006).
25 id.
26 Id. at 195.27 id
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defendant knows of actual instances of copyright infringement and
has failed to take measures to stop the infringement.28
Evidence that the defendant designed and sold his services or
machinery with the intent to induce infringement is powerful
evidence of contributory liability. In addition, evidence that the
defendant's services or machinery were designed specifically to be
used to infringe should establish contributory liability. By contrast,
a defendant's general - yet certain - knowledge that his product
will be used by some customers to infringe copyrights is not, by
itself, enough to establish contributory liability.
The contributory copyright liability standard was formulated in
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.29 The
plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendant Sony from manufacturing
Betamax Video Tape Recorders based on claims of contributory
copyright infringement.3 0 Sony, in contesting that it met the
knowingly test for contributory liability, pointed to other non-
infringing uses to which customers had put their Betamax
machines-including time-shifting, the recording of television
shows in order to watch them at other than scheduled times.3 1 The
Supreme Court agreed with Sony, holding that a defendant could
not be held contributorily liable for copyright infringement if the
defendant's "product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable
purposes."32 The defendant's equipment "need merely be capable
of substantial noninfringing uses" in order for the defendant to
escape contributory liability.33 Sony was a defeat for copyright
holders because its holding only required that defendants show
their technology is capable of substantial, non-infringing uses in
order to escape contributory liability.3 4
B. FROM SONY TO GROKSTER
28 Id




34 J. Brian Beckham, Can the RIAA Survive "Substantial Non-Infringing
Uses?", 10 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4, 6 (2005).
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The advent of new technology, including the peer-to-peer file-
sharing services such as Napster,"' Kazaa, 6 and Grokster," created
pressure on copyright holders who discovered that those and other
new Internet technologies were being used by thousands of
individuals to commit copyright infringement." Three cases-
Grokster,3 9 In re Aimster, 0 and Napster"-further raised the issue
of contributory negligence in the context of the Internet. Aimster
and Napster followed Sony's basic analysis that contributory
liability required that the defendant actually know that its service
was being used for infringing purposes.4 2 Sony holds that if the
defendant can show that its product or service is capable of a
substantial non-infringing use, the defendant can escape liability
absent other evidence that the defendant had knowledge of
copyright infringement. In Aimster and Napster, the courts found
direct evidence that both defendants were aware of and had
3 Benny Evangelista, Napster Runs Out of Lives - Judge Rules Against Sale,
S. F. CHRON., Sept. 4, 2002, at Bl; Rich Menta, RIAA Sues Music Startup
Napster for $20 Billion, MP3 NEWSWIRE, Dec. 9, 1999,
http://www.mp3newswire.net/stories/napster.html (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology;.
36 Robert Menta, Judge to Decide on KaZaa Suit, MP3 NEWSWIRE, Nov. 27,
2002, http://www.mp3newswire.net/stories/2002/kazaatrial.html (on file with
the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
37 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
38 Jefferson Graham, Record labels cut deals with file-sharing companies,
USA TODAY, Dec. 3, 2004 at B3 (citing the Internet measurement service
BigChampagne, about 1.4 billion songs were available for unauthorized free
trading in October [2004], despite the nearly 7,000 lawsuits filed against
individual copyright infringers in the preceding year).
39 Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
40 In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 653 (7th Cir. 2003) (For
purposes of copyright law, even when there are noninfringing uses of an Internet
file-sharing service, "if the infringing uses are substantial then to avoid liability
as a contributory infringer the provider of the service must show that it would
have been disproportionately costly for him to eliminate or at least reduce
substantially the infringing uses.").
4 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001)
("[I]f a computer system operator learns of specific infringing material available
on his system and fails to purge such material from the system, the operator
knows of and contributes to direct infringement.").
42 In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003), A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
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encouraged specific copyright infringement by individual users,
rendering irrelevant the fact that the defendants' software was
capable of substantial non-infringing uses.43
In Grokster, however, the Ninth Circuit came to a different
conclusion based on the particular facts of the case.44 Plaintiffs,
including MGM Studios, alleged that the defendant, Grokster, had
distributed free peer-to-peer file-sharing software that enabled
users to easily distribute and copy content, including music and
movies, from other users on the Internet.45 Plaintiffs provided
evidence showing that Grokster had sought out and had given its
free software to users of Napster, the earlier file-sharing system.46
Plaintiffs alleged that Grokster's business plan, in essence, had
been built around copyright infringement and that while Sony
might ordinarily control, here Grokster's bad faith barred it from
claiming Sony's safe harbor by pointing to possible non-infringing
uses to which Grokster's software could be employed.4 7
However, the Ninth Circuit, in issuing a summary judgment in
favor of the defendant, found that the plaintiff copyright holders
had failed to prove specific knowledge of infringement on the part
of the defendant.48 Given the failure to prove that Grokster knew
of instances of copyright infringement, the Ninth Circuit followed
Sony in acknowledging that, since Grokster's software was capable
of substantial non-infringing uses, the fact that the plaintiffs had
merely shown that Grokster's software could be used for
43 In re Aimster 334 F.3d at 651 (noting Aimster's "tutorial gives as its only
examples of file sharing the sharing of copyrighted music, including copyrighted
music that the recording industry had notified Aimster was being infringed by
Aimster's users"); Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021 ("Regardless of the number of
Napster's infringing versus noninfringing uses, the evidentiary record here
supported the district court's finding that plaintiffs would likely prevail in
establishing that Napster knew or had reason to know of its users' infringement
of plaintiffs' copyrights.").
44 Metro-Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154,
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infringement was not enough to impute knowledge and,
consequently, contributory liability to Grokster.49
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that:
"[o]ne who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to
infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative
steps taken to foster infringement, going beyond mere distribution with
knowledge of third-party action, is liable for the resulting acts of
infringement by third parties using the device, regardless of the device's
lawful uses."o
As Alfred Yen has noted, "Grokster sent a strong signal that
the Supreme Court considers fault the primary theory of third-party
copyright liability." 5'
C. PERFECT 10 AND CONTRIBUTORY LIABILITY
Perfect 10, an Internet pornography company, filed suit against
a variety of plaintiffs, including Amazon and Google. 52  Google,
however, was the principal object of the suit. Among other claims,
Perfect 10 alleged that third-party websites not under Google's
control had directly infringed Perfect 10's copyrights by
reproducing and displaying unauthorized copies of Perfect 10's
images, a claim undisputed by Google.53 Perfect 10 further alleged
that Google was contributorily liable because Google's search
engine returned results that listed the infringing sites, thereby
allowing users to retrieve Perfect 10's images from infringing
websites.54 Google, however, maintained that given its search
engines' capability and use for substantial non-infringing purposes,
4 9 Id. at 1161.
50 Metro-Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936-
37 (2005).
51 Yen, supra note 24, at 227 (The logic of Sony's emphasis on "substantial
non-infringing use" did not necessarily mean that a defendant whose product
had not yet been used for non-infringing purposes was contributorily liable of
copyright infringement. The defendant merely had to prove that the product was
"capable" of a non-infringing use. Grokster closed the door Sony opened by
barring defendants from pointing to such capabilities to escape liability if they
had acted in bad faith in the first place.).
52 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007).
53 Id. at 725-26.
54 Id.
9 NC JOLT ONLINE ED. 1, 10 (2007)
Perfect 10 and Contributory Liability
it could not be contributorily liable under Sony." The question for
the Ninth Circuit, then, was whether Google's search engine
function had contributed to the infringement of Perfect 10's
copyrights by enabling copyright infringers to locate and download
those images."6
The court noted two theories under which Google could be
held liable for contributory infringement.57 First, liability could be
found under the Sony rule by a defendant "distributing a product
distributees use to infringe copyrights, if the product is not capable
of 'substantial' or 'commercially significant' noninfringing uses.""
Second, under the recently articulated Grokster rule, liability could
be found by a defendant "actively encouraging (or inducing)
infringement through specific acts."' 9 Under the first category of
liability, the court agreed with Google's position that, according to
Sony, it could not be held liable for contributory infringement
given the search engine's substantial number of non-infringing
uses. 6 0
The court next turned to the second theory of liability, noting
that while Grokster held that the Sony rule:
"limits imputing culpable intent as a matter of law from the
characteristics or uses of a distributed product. . .nothing in Sony
requires courts to ignore evidence of intent if there is such evidence,
and the case was never meant to foreclose rules of fault-based liability
derived from the common law."
In Grokster, the defendants had engaged in business activities that
indicated they sought to encourage and even profit from other
parties' direct infringement of copyrighted works. 62 For instance,
the Court noted that the defendants had marketed their services and
5 Id. at 727.
56 Id. at 726 27.57 Id.
58 Id. (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 442 (1984)).
59 Metro-Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 942
(2005) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
60 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, 487 F.3d 701, 727 (9th Cir. 2007).
61 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 934-35.
62 Id.
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software to former Napster users who had been "deprived of a
mechanism to copy and distribute what were overwhelmingly
infringing files after the collapse of Napster."63
While the Supreme Court in Grokster noted that Sony's rule
did not preclude it from using other theories of liability from
common law, Grokster involved defendants who had clearly
encouraged copyright infringement through the marketing and
design of its software. The Court in that circumstance could not
permit the defendants, acting in bad faith, to escape contributory
liability simply because the defendants could point to the fact that
their software was indeed capable, in theory, of substantial non-
infringing uses.
Instead of limiting itself to a "fault-based" theory of
inducement in Perfect 10, the Ninth Circuit used Grokster to argue
that the Supreme Court had opened the door to other theories of
common law liability.6 4 The court pointed to previous rulings in
the circuit" showing that, under a theory of imputed liability,
where defendants had specific knowledge of copyright
infringement by third parties, defendants could be held
contributorily liable.6 6 It remanded the case to the district court for
a determination of whether Google "had knowledge that infringing
Perfect 10 images were available using its search engine, could
take simple measures to prevent further damage to Perfect 10's
copyrighted works, and failed to take such steps."67
D. PERFECT 10'S CHALLENGE TO SEARCH ENGINES
As Alfred Yen has noted, the Supreme Court signaled in
Grokster an emphasis on fault-based notions of contributory
63 Id. at 939.
64 Perfect 10, 487 F.3d at 727.
65 See, e.g., A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (2001); Religious
Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal.
1995) (holding that an Internet Service Provider could be held contributorily
liable if it had actual knowledge of unauthorized copyrighted materials on its
electronic systems).
66 Perfect 10, 487 F.3d at 729.
67 Id.
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liability." When companies market products used solely for
copyright infringement and when those products are not capable of
substantial non-infringing uses, the companies can be held liable
for contributory copyright liability under Sony. Similarly, when a
company's business activities, such as advertising decisions,
demonstrate that the company's hope is to induce copyright
infringement, it can also be found liable under Grokster.
The Ninth Circuit, by emphasizing "simple measures to
prevent further damages," seeks to broaden the Supreme Court's
approach to contributory liability by looking to the ease and
relative cost to the defendant in preventing copyright infringement
by users of the defendant's product.6 9 The Ninth Circuit's more
expansive approach to contributory liability, while a boon for
copyright holders, could be problematic for search engines like
Google. The court established a two-step approach for the district
court. First, it instructed the district court to determine whether
Google knew of instances of copyright infringement. Second, it
instructed the district court to determine whether Google could use
simple means to eliminate the offending copyrighted material from
its search engine.'
The test is problematic because its focus underestimates the
actual, cumulative costs of eliminating copyrighted material.
Google could easily eliminate the copyrighted material from search
results requested by users by "filtering" the results so that they do
not list the offending material. The cost of filtering material in the
individual instance is low, requiring software instructions added by
Google to its search engine that simply exclude copyrighted
material from display to end users. Thus, the district court could
find the costs low and the means simple, warranting a finding of
contributory liability against Google for failing to implement the
solution.
The Ninth Circuit's approach, however, becomes problematic
once one considers the scale and purpose of a search engine such
68 Yen, supra note 24, at 227-229.
69 Perfect 10, 487 F.3d at 729.
70 Id.
71 Id.
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as Google. Google at present catalogs billions of web pages
worldwide.72 Other search engines have similarly massive
repositories of information. The cost of filtering search results to
eliminate copyrighted material, while low in the individual
instance, could have the net effect of compromising the integrity of
the search engine itself by producing incomplete or partial results
for users. In Sony, the Supreme Court appears to have been
motivated by the understanding that technologies capable of
infringing uses also have the promise to create significant value
and benefits to the public at large. Consequently, the Sony Court
took a narrow approach toward applying the contributory liability
doctrine to manufacturers like Sony, recognizing that a ruling
holding companies like Sony liable for contributory liability would
sharply limit or even curtail the development of a new
technology.74
Google and other search engines, which offer promising but
not fully realized technologies to the public, are in a position that is
similar to the one in which Sony found itself in 1983. Google's
value as a search engine is predicated in large part on its ability to
return comprehensive and reliable search results to users. Indeed,
this comprehensiveness is what has propelled Google to the
forefront of the search industry." The Perfect 10 ruling, however,
jeopardizes not only Google's position but also the viability of
every search engine, since it effectively requires such services to
return incomplete search results-that is to say, search results
without the offending copyrighted material because efforts to filter
out copyrighted material are always imperfect.
In theory, copyright holders are correct that their words ought
to be protected by filtering. In reality, however, search engines and
content aggregators like Google may be required to use filters that,
72 Larry Page & Sergey Brin, 2006 Founders' Letter,
http://investor.google.com/2006_foundersletter.html (last viewed Sept. 18,
2007) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
73 Sony, 464 U.S. at 792.
74 Id. at 788-89.
Kevin J. Delaney, Google Updates Look OfIts Search Results, WALL ST. J.,
May 17, 2007, at B3 ("Google is the leading search engine in terms of the
number of queries handled in the U.S.").
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given the potential liability to them, will "overfilter" results to
avoid the threat of litigation. For instance, under the Ninth
Circuit's ruling Google could be required to filter all search results
so as not to return any images that are linked to the phrase "perfect
10" or "perfect ten." Thus, unauthorized websites that reproduce
Perfect 10's copyrighted material would be filtered out of Google's
search, but so would websites that report on gymnastics. Indeed, at
the time of the writing of this paper, there were more than 1.6
million hits for the phrase "perfect 10."116 Many of these cites do
not return Perfect 10's images, but rather report on the legal battles
between Perfect 10 and various websites.
The Ninth Circuit, instead, would do well to follow the spirit of
Sony. The Supreme Court's acknowledgement of common law
theories of liability in Grokster was fact-specific and aimed at bad
faith defendants who intended that their technology be used by
individuals to infringe on others' copyrighted materials. The Court
did not create an invitation to look to common law generally to
broaden the scope of contributory liability. Sony implores courts
to recognize that new technologies that can be used for copyright
infringement also frequently have significant long-term and
beneficial purposes for the public at large. In this new age of
digital technology, courts would do well to adopt the conservative,
narrow view of contributory liability that enabled the flourishing of
the videotape revolution in the 1980s and could permit the further
development of digital technology.
The narrow interpretation of contributory liability as applicable
only to defendants who can be found to have knowingly or
intentionally induced infringement (per Grokster) or to defendants
who cannot show that their commercial products are capable of a
substantial number of non-infringing uses (per Sony) does place
burdens on copyright holders who seek to defend their works from
infringement. Limiting Perfect 10's ability to seek a remedy from
Google would require Perfect 10 to sue the dozens, even hundreds,
76 Search ofgoogle.com (last viewed Sept. 18, 2007) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
7 Search of google.com (last viewed Sept. 18, 2007) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
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of direct infringers who have created websites that misappropriate
Perfect 10's copyrighted material.
III. CONCLUSION
All is not lost for copyright holders under a narrow
interpretation of contributory liability. For instance, technological
improvements in the digital rights management of copyrighted
material may enable copyright holders to control the distribution of
their material. In addition, the approach suggested by this recent
development would not absolve search engines or content
aggregators of any responsibility. For instance, where evidence
that a search engine has targeted a particular industry or is tailored
to locating a particular type of content that has faced significant
copyright infringement may demonstrate the search engine
operator's desire to induce and thereby profit from copyright
infringement.
Those factors may not be enough to limit copyright
infringement. But copyright has never been an absolute right.
Rather, it is a right that Congress and the courts have balanced
against other important social goods and values.7 9 The approach
recommended in this recent development recognizes that digital
and communication technologies are still in their infancy and that a
narrow theory of contributory liability best balances copyright
holders' rights with the significant, current-and potential-
benefits offered by search engines.
78 See, e.g., Walter S. Mossberg, Media Companies Go Too Far in Curbing
Consumers' Activities, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 2005 (Digital Rights Management
(DRM) exists in a variety of forms, but has allowed content creators to distribute
material, including music, to customers, while limiting those customers or other
parties from further unauthorized copying and distribution.).
79 Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARv. L. R. 1105, 1127
(1990) (Fair Use doctrine is the obvious example of balancing the copyright
holder's interests with the public interest in commenting upon and criticizing
copyrighted content.).
